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Men uniting into politick societies, have resigned up to the publick
the disposing of all their Force, so that they cannot employ it




The Second Amendment is an enigma. Although many aspects
of the Bill of Rights are controversial, disputes usually focus on such
questions as how far particular rights should extend and how they
should apply under modern circumstances. By contrast, there is no
consensus on even the most basic meaning of the Second
Amendment, which reads, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."2  Instead, the scholarly literature is
sharply divided between two opposing views. One position asserts
that the Second Amendment was intended to guarantee an individual
right to keep and bear arms.' The other holds that the right is one
that belongs to the people collectively, and that the right is essentially
connected with the establishment of "[a] well regulated Militia."
4
1. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXVIII,
§ 10, at 353 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1700).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED (1994); JOYCE LEE
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT
(1994); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) [hereinafter Kates,
Original Meaning]; Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, J.
AM. HIST. 599 (1982); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Bear Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Symposium, Gun Control, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1986); A Second Amendment Symposium Issue, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1995). For a more
extensive listing of this literature, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 5-11, at 897 n.211 (3d ed. 2000). A valuable overview may be found in Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995). For some
critiques of the individual right view, see GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 207-24, 252-60 (1999); Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun
Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST.
REV. 567 (1998); Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62;
and the articles that appear in 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 221-81 (1999).
4. In addition to many of the articles in this issue, Symposium on the Second Amendment:
Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000), see, for example, Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden
History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998); Carl T. Bogus, Race,
Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993); Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community:
The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Keith A.
Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy
and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991).
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In resolving this debate, the most common methods of
constitutional interpretation are of limited use. At least to modern
readers, the Amendment's language is ambiguous. The subject of the
constitutional right, "the people," can be understood either in a
collective sense, to refer to the community as a whole, or in an
aggregate sense, to refer to all of its members. The reference to the
"Militia" points in a collective direction but is not conclusive on its
own. As to the broader context of usage within the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, those documents use "the people" in both senses:
sometimes collectively, sometimes individually., Contemporary
5. The Constitution's opening words, "we the People," clearly use the term collectively:
only the community is capable of "ordain[ing] and establish[ing]" a constitution for the body
politic. U.S. CONST. preamble. The term is also employed collectively in Article 1, Section 2,
Clause 1, which provides that the members of the House of Representatives shall be elected by
"the People of the several States."
Indeed, the original Constitution never uses "people" in any other sense. When the
document refers to individuals, it uses the term "person." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2
(providing that "no Person shall be a Representative" who shall not have certain specified
qualifications); id. § 3, cl. 3 (same with respect to Senators); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (same with
respect to the president); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (providing that "no person holding any office under
the United States, shall be a member of either House during his Continuance in Office"); id. § 7,
cl. 2 (providing that, when the House and Senate vote on whether to override the president's
veto, "the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal
of each House respectively"); id. § 9, cl. 1 (barring Congress from prohibiting "[t]he Migration
or Importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,"
prior to 1808, but permitting Congress to impose "a Tax or duty... on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person"); id. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3 (describing the procedure for
electing the president); id. art. III, § 3, cls. 1-2 (limiting federal power to define and punish
treason); id. art. IV, § 2, cls. 2-3 (requiring states to deliver up fugitive slaves and fugitives from
justice).
In many cases, the Bill of Rights also uses "person," or some other singular term, when
referring to individuals. See id. amend. III (forbidding the peacetime quartering of soldiers "in
any house, without the consent of the Owner"); id. amend. IV (requiring that warrants give a
particular description of "the persons or things to be seized"); id. amend. V (providing that no
"person" shall be subjected to certain forms of criminal proceedings, "be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," or have property taken for public use without
just compensation); id. amend. VI (setting forth the rights of "the accused" in criminal
prosecutions).
Moreover, the Bill of Rights sometimes uses "the people" in a collective sense. See id.
amend. X (reserving certain powers to "the States respectively, or to the people"). But not
always. It is difficult to deny that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures" was intended to protect a right of individuals as such. Other uses of "people"
within the Bill of Rights might be interpreted as having either an individual or a collective sense,
or perhaps both. For example, while the First Amendment "right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" is often said to refer to
individuals, assembly involves collective activity (which is one reason why the Stuart monarchy
regarded it as a threat to government). Similarly, the Ninth Amendment's reference to "other[
rights] retained by the people" is not necessarily limited to individual rights, but may also
encompass rights retained by the people as a whole when they establish a government.
In short-contrary to claims often made on both sides of the debate-the Second
Amendment's reference to "the people" does not, simply as a textual matter, commit us to
either an individual or a collective right interpretation of the Amendment. As I shall show,
20001
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debates over the Amendment were sparse and generally
unilluminating.6 And, in contrast to most other provisions of the Bill
of Rights, the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the meaning of the
Second Amendment.
7
Faced with these difficulties, constitutional scholars and
historians often seek to understand the Second Amendment by
situating it within a larger tradition or body of thought. Some
scholars, on both sides of the debate, have discussed the
Amendment's background in the English legal and constitutional
tradition.8  Others have connected the right to arms with civic
republican thought.9 And still others, especially on the individual
rights side, have argued that the Amendment reflects natural rights
philosophy.10
This argument-which has been advanced in varying forms by
Randy Barnett, Stephen Halbrook, Don Kates, Nelson Lund, Joyce
Lee Malcolm, and others" -runs as follows. According to the natural
rights tradition, which deeply influenced the American founders,
individuals had an inalienable right to defend themselves against
violence. It was to protect this right, among others, that society and
government were formed. Within society, citizens had a right to
defend themselves not only against private violence, but also against
tyranny and oppression by the government itself. But this right could
not be effectively exercised without arms. According to this view, the
Second Amendment was intended, at least in part, to enable
individuals to exercise their natural right to self-defense.
however, the Second Amendment was largely derived from comparable provisions in the post-
Revolutionary state declarations of rights, and the language of these provisions sheds a good
deal of light on the problem. See infra Part III.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 214-16.
7. The most recent major Supreme Court decision is United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939). For a discussion of Miller and other cases in the Supreme Court and lower courts, see
Michael Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291
(2000).
8. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 3; Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The
English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 27 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Civic Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second
Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2000).
10. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 3; Barnett & Kates, supra note 3, at 1176-79; Kates,
Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 229-30, 254; Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and
the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1992) [hereinafter Kates, Self-
Protection]; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right of Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 118-21 (1987).
11. See supra note 10.
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On its face, this view is a powerful one. Indeed, even Garry
Wills, one of the most forceful critics of the individualist
interpretation, concedes that arguments for "a natural right to own
guns". "might be sound or strong," though he denies that the Second
Amendment was meant to secure such a right.'
2
The object of this Article is to challenge this understanding of
the natural rights tradition. While that tradition did hold that
individuals in a state of nature had a broad right to use force for self-
preservation, that right was not an inalienable one. Instead, when
individuals entered into society, they largely gave up this right in
return for the protection they obtained under the law. And although
the people retained the right to resist tyranny, this was a right that
belonged to the community as a whole rather than to individuals. For
these reasons, the natural rights tradition provides more support for a
collective right than for an individualist interpretation of the Second
Amendment.
My discussion will proceed in four parts. Part I begins with John
Locke's classic account of natural rights in the Second Treatise of
Government.13 Part II focuses on Sir William Blackstone's account of
the right to arms, 4 which provides the strongest textual evidence for a
natural rights interpretation of the Amendment. Parts III and IV
explore the right to arms in post-Revolutionary American thought
and in the debates surrounding the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. The Article concludes with some reflections on what this
history means for how the Second Amendment should be interpreted
today.
I. LOCKE AND THE NATURAL RIGHTS TRADITION
A. Is There a Right to Arms for Personal Self-Defense?
The best place to start is with Locke, whose writings laid the
foundations for natural rights theory in eighteenth-century England
and America. Locke never mentions a right to arms for personal self-
defense. At first glance, however, his theory would appear to strongly
support such a right. Locke begins by envisioning individuals in a
state of nature, before the formation of civil society and
12. WILLS, supra note 3, at 259.
13. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II (Peter Laslett ed., student ed.
1988) (3d ed. 1698).
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144.
2000]
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government.15 In that state, individuals are not only entitled to life,
liberty, and property16 but also have a right to do anything necessary
to preserve them, within the bounds of the law of nature. 17  In
particular, everyone has a natural right to judge for himself whether
others are invading his rights, and to vindicate those rights by force if
necessary.' 8 Indeed, the right to use force is not limited to self-
defense. According to Locke, the fundamental law of nature enjoins
the preservation not only of oneself but of mankind in general. 9 In a
state of nature, everyone is entitled to enforce this law by punishing
those who injure other human beings.
20
Thus, Locke recognizes a broad natural right to use force for the
protection of oneself and others. If one assumes that weapons are
useful for this purpose, then Locke's theory seems to provide a
powerful justification for an individual right to have them. And if the
purpose of government is to protect natural rights, it seems to follow
that the law should recognize and secure this right. Of course, that is
the conclusion that advocates of the individual right interpretation of
the Second Amendment draw from Locke's work.2' In my view,
however, this conclusion is mistaken. For the thrust of Locke's
discussion is not to endorse a broad private right to use force, but
exactly the opposite: to show why such a right must be radically
restricted.
According to Locke, it is precisely the unrestrained use of force
that makes the state of nature intolerable.22 The problem is that when
every individual is judge in his own case, he is likely to act out of
passion and self-interest, pursuing his own advantage at the expense
of the rights of others.23 The lack of a clear, settled law to govern
interactions between individuals aggravates the situation.24
Moreover, even when one is in the right, one may lack sufficient
power to protect oneself and one's rights .2  For all these reasons,
15. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 4-15, at 269-78.
16. See id. §§ 4, 123, at 269, 350.
17. See id. §§ 87, 128, 171, at 323-24, 352, 381-82.
18. See id. §§ 87, 91, at 323-24, 326-27.
19. See id. §§ 6, 159, 183, at 270-71, 374-75, 390-91.
20. See id. §§ 7-12, at 271-75.
21. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 28-29; Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 10, at 90;
Lund, supra note 10, at 119 n.38.
22. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 123-27, at 350-52.
23. See id. §§ 13, 90, 125, at 275-76, 326, 351.
24. See id. § 124, at 350-51.
25. See id. § 126, at 351.
[Vol. 76:237
NA TURAL RIGHTS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
individuals live a most precarious existence in the state of nature,
which is constantly in danger of degenerating into a war of all against
all.
2 6
The remedy for these evils lies in the social contract, in which
individuals agree to form a society for the preservation of their life,
liberty, and property.27 The terms of this contract have a crucial
bearing on our problem. According to Locke, when an individual
enters civil society, "he gives up" his
Power... of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the Preservation of
himself, and the rest of Mankind.... to be regulated by Laws made
by the Society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the
rest of that Society shall require; which Laws of the Society in many
things confine the liberty he had by the Law of Nature.28
In return, the individual obtains all the benefits of society, including
the right to be protected by the "whole strength" of the community.
2 9
To make this protection possible, individuals "engage [their] natural
force" to assist the community in enforcing the law, as well as
defending the society from external danger 0
In short, while there is a broad natural right to use force for self-
preservation, this is not an inalienable right, that is, a right that
individuals can never part with. Indeed, according to Locke, it is only
by surrendering this right that human beings are able to form a
society at all. For the very notion of political society is that rights
should be determined and disputes resolved not through the "private
judgement" of each individual, backed by private force, but rather by
the public judgment of the community, as expressed in general laws
enacted by the legislature, administered by impartial judges, and
enforced by the power of the community as a whole .3  For these
26. See id. §§ 21,123, 127, at 282, 350, 352.
27. See id. §§ 87-89, 123, at 323-25, 350.
28. Id. §§ 128-29, at 352-53; see also id. § 171, at 381-82. In addition, under the social
contract, the individual "wholly gives up" his or her power to punish violations of the law of
nature, and transfers this power to the community. Id. §§ 130, 171, at 353, 381-82.
29. Id. § 130, at 353.
30. Id.; see also id. §§ 88-89, at 324-25 (stating same principle).
31. Id. §§ 87-88, at 323-25. Locke's view is well summarized in the following passage:
Man being born ... with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment
of all the Rights and Priviledges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other Man, or
Number of Men in the World, hath by Nature a Power, not only to preserve his
Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate, against the Injuries and Attempts of
other Men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that Law in others, as he is
perswaded the Offence deserves, even with Death it self, in Crimes where the
heinousness of the Fact, in his Opinion, requires it. But because no Political Society
can be, nor subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in
order thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that Society; there, and there only
is Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power,
2000]
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reasons, Locke determines that the right to use force is an alienable
right-a right that individuals give up when they form the social
contract.
This point emerges clearly when we compare this right with the
liberty of conscience, which Locke regards as the paradigmatic
inalienable right. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, he argues that
the capacity to form one's own beliefs is inherent in and inseparable
from the human mind-in a strict sense, it is impossible to part with
this freedom.32 Holding one's own religious beliefs does no injury to
others.33 Nor is there anything to be gained by relinquishing this
right, for salvation can be attained only through sincere belief and
worship.3 4 For these reasons, freedom of belief is an inalienable right.
And these arguments can be generalized to apply to freedom of
thought more broadly. 35 By contrast, the liberty to use force against
others, particularly with weapons, is not inseparable from individuals,
and does impact on the rights of others. And there is a great deal to
be gained by surrendering this right, for as a rule individuals are much
more likely to attain security and preservation when the private use
of force is excluded. It follows that the right to use force, unlike
liberty of thought and belief, is an alienable right. This point is
summed up in Locke's remark that "though Men uniting into politick
societies, have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their
Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-Citizen, any
farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they still retain the
power of Thinking" as they like,36 since that right is an inalienable
one.37
resign'd it up into the hands of the Community in all cases that exclude him not from
appealing for Protection to the Law established by it. And thus all private judgement
of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by
settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties; and by Men having
Authority from the Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides all the
differences that may happen between any Members of that Society, concerning any
matter of right; and punishes those Offences, which any Member hath committed
against the Society, with such Penalties as the Law has established ....
Id. § 87, at 232-24.
32 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26-27 (James Tully ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (William Popple trans., 1st ed. 1689).
33. See id. at 46-47.
34. See id. at 26-28.
35. For an exploration of Locke's views on freedom of thought, see Steven J. Heyman, The
Liberty of Rational Creatures: Lockean Natural Rights and the Freedom of Speech and
Thought (Nov. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
36. LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 10, at 353. For other passages in which
Locke draws such a contrast, see LOCKE, supra note 32, at 26-28, 47-48 (asserting that when
individuals enter society, they "arm[ the Magistrate] with the Force and Strength of all his
Subjects" for the protection of their rights to life, liberty, and property, but retain the
[Vol. 76:237
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The implications of our discussion for a right to arms should be
clear. If individuals had an inalienable right to use force for self-
preservation, they might also have a right to possess and use weapons
for that purpose. But this argument fails if the right to use force is
one that individuals surrender when they enter into society.
There is, however, an important exception to the general rule
that the right to use force is an alienable one. Individuals give up this
right only in those cases in which they are able to appeal to the law
for protection. 8 For this reason, Locke holds that when an individual
faces an imminent attack on his life or person, he has a right to use all
necessary force to defend himself.39 To this extent, the right to self-
defense is an inalienable one which is retained within civil society. If
this is true, however, does it not follow that individuals also have an
inalienable right to own arms for self-defense?
There is no way to know what Locke would have thought of this
argument, for he never addressed the issue. The logic of this view,
however, is hardly compelling from a Lockean perspective. The
difficulty with the argument is that it confuses two different questions:
what an individual may rightfully do when he is subject to imminent
attack, and what measures the legislature may properly take ex ante
to protect the lives and safety of citizens. When a person is assaulted,
he may do anything reasonably necessary to defend himself. This
includes not only using his own natural force, but also using anything
else in his possession, such as a deadly weapon. It does not follow,
however, that the legislature cannot properly make a prospective
judgment that citizens would enjoy a higher level of security if the
possession of such weapons were restricted or even banned. To be
sure, such a law would not be justified if weapons could be employed
only for lawful self-defense. But that obviously is not the case, since
they can also be used to wrongfully assault others. Under these
circumstances, it is an empirical question whether the community
would be safer with or without restrictions on guns. And that would
inalienable right to liberty of conscience).
37. It follows that individual right scholars are mistaken when they suggest that the natural
rights tradition regarded the right to use force for self-preservation as no less fundamental than
the rights protected by the First Amendment. See Lund, supra note 10, at 119 ("In liberal
theory, the right to self-defense is the most fundamental of all rights-far more basic than the
guarantees of free speech, freedom of religion, jury trial, and due process of law."); id. at 123
("[T]he right of self-defense is more fundamentally rooted in our political traditions than are
First Amendment rights.").
38. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 87-88, 171, at 323-25, 381-82.
39. See, e.g., id. §§ 19, 207, at 280-81, 403-04.
2000] 245
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seem to be a question for the legislature to decide.
To summarize, Lockean theory holds that when individuals
establish a society, they give up the right to use force against others in
return for the protection they receive from the community.
Immediate self-defense is an exception to this principle, for in that
case there is no opportunity to appeal for protection. But one way in
which the government can protect its citizens is by regulating the
possession and use of weapons. For this reason, such regulation
appears to fall on the alienable, not the inalienable, side of the line.
To put the point another way, Locke does not regard the ability
of individuals to use force in their own defense as an end in itself.
Instead, it is a means to the fundamental end of natural law-the
preservation of oneself and of mankind in general. 40 Indeed, as
Locke's account of the state of nature demonstrates, the unrestrained
right to use force according to one's own private judgment actually
undermines, rather than furthers, the goal of self-preservation by
leading to a war of all against all.41  Rational individuals would
therefore choose to give up this right and to form a society for mutual
preservation. 42 Just as preservation is the reason why human beings
institute government in the first place, so it also constitutes the "end
or measure" of the government's power.43 It follows that if the
legislature reasonably determines that restrictions on weapons would
advance this end, such restrictions would not violate the Lockean
conception of natural rights.
That is not to say, of course, that Locke can be counted as a
supporter of gun control laws, for he never addressed the issue.
Instead, the point is simply that it is a mistake to assume, as many
adherents of the individual right interpretation do, that the issue can
be resolved through an appeal to the notion of inalienable rights.
Instead, from a Lockean perspective, the matter is one that appears
to fall within the legislature's power to regulate for the common good.
B. The Lockean Rights of Resistance and Revolution
Thus far the question has been whether, on a Lockean view,
individuals have a right to arms in order to defend themselves against
40. See, e.g., id. § 16, at 278-79 (deriving the right to self-defense from "the Fundamental
Law of Nature," the preservation of mankind).
41. See, e.g., id. §§ 13, 21, at 275-76, 282.
42. See id. §§ 123-31, at 350-53.
43. Id. § 171, at 381-82.
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private violence. Now let us consider whether they have such a right
in order to defend themselves against the government itself.
Locke holds that, under the social contract, all political power is
initially vested in the community as a whole. 44 This includes the
authority not only to make laws but also to direct the force of all the
members of the community in order to execute those laws, as well as
to defend against external dangers.45 In turn, the community usually
delegates this political power to a particular government.46  The
power is given with the trust that it be used only for the public good.47
Yet it is the nature of rulers, no less than other human beings, to
pursue their own self-interest.4 For this reason, there is a danger that
the rulers may come to perceive themselves as having "a distinct
interest from the rest of the community. '49 The government may then
become tyrannical and seek to assert "absolute Arbitrary Power"
over the people. 0
In this situation, Locke argues that the people have a right to
resist tyranny and to overthrow the government. Indeed, the
immediate polemical purpose of the Two Treatises was to justify the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which the absolutist King James II
was driven out of England and replaced by William and Mary of
Orange. In this Section, I will briefly explore Locke's account of
resistance and revolution, and then discuss whether, as some scholars
contend, his theory supports an individual right to keep and bear
arms to oppose tyranny.5
2
This portion of the Second Treatise, which was written in the
midst of a revolutionary upheaval, is far from a model of clarity, nor
is it free from a certain degree of conflict and inconsistency. I believe,
however, that Locke's position can fairly be described as follows.
The right of the people to resist oppression is a major theme of
the Second Treatise. When rulers become tyrannical, they exercise
force beyond the bounds of their rightful authority53 and thereby
44. See id. § 87, at 323-24.
45. See id. §§ 3, 88-89, at 268, 324-25.
46. See id. §§ 132, 134, at 354, 355-57.
47. See id. §§ 3, 131, 135, 171, at 268, 353, 357-58, 381-82.
48. For Locke's view that human beings are impelled to pursue their own interests, see
LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 41-55, at 258-70.
49. LOCKE, supra note 13, § 143, at 364; see also id. § 138, at 360-61.
50. Id. §§ 135-37, at 357-60.
51. See id. at 137.
52. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 28-29.
53. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 199, 202, at 398-99, 400-01.
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place themselves in a state of war with their subjects,5 4 who are
entitled to defend themselves under the fundamental natural law of
self-preservation. 5 The question then arises as to whether Locke
conceives of this right to resistance as an individual or a collective
one.
In principle, Locke holds that this right to resistance may be
exercised not only by the community but also by private individuals.
56
For several reasons, however, he puts little stock in a private right of
resistance. First, such resistance is almost certain to be futile, for it is
unreasonable to believe that a few individuals will be able to prevail
against the force of the government.57 Second, Locke recognizes that
his position is vulnerable to the objection that it would promote
unjustified uprisings and rebellions, which, by plunging a country into
civil war, are among "the greatest Crime[s] ... a Man is capable of."
'58
Locke's response to both of these concerns is the same: resistance is
unlikely to occur unless a majority of the people come to regard the
government as tyrannical and oppressive.59 Thus for Locke resistance
turns out to be collective in nature. This is certainly true as a
practical matter, and it may well reflect considerations of principle as
well. After all, the purpose of the social contract is to avoid a state of
war by excluding "all private judgement" and private force, and
ensuring that disputes are resolved as far as possible by the public
judgment of the community. 60 A private right to determine that the
government is tyrannical and should be resisted is, of course, in some
tension with this purpose. But a right of the community to make this
judgment is entirely consonant with it.61
For all of these reasons, Locke's account strongly focuses on the
right of the people as a whole to resist tyranny. Indeed, the right of
resistance is almost inextricably connected with the right of
revolution-the right to determine that the government has forfeited
its authority and ought to be replaced with a new one.62 And that is
54. See id. §§ 155, 222, 232, 242, at 370-71, 412-14, 419-20, 427.
55. See id. §§ 149, 168, 222, at 366-67, 379-80, 412-14.
56. See id. §§ 168, 208, at 379-80, 404.
57. See id. §§ 208, 230, at 404, 417-18.
58. Id. § 230, at 418; see id. §§ 203, 208, 230, at 401, 404, 417-18.
59. See id. §§ 208-09, 230, at 404-05, 417-18.
60. Id. § 87, at 324; see supra text accompanying note 31.
61. For one passage that takes a similar approach, see LOCKE, supra note 13, § 242, at 427
(suggesting that, if possible, controversies between the ruler and a portion of the people should
be submitted to the judgment of "the Body of the People").
62. See id. §§ 149, 212, 220, 222, 240-43, at 366-67, 407-08, 411, 412-14, 426-28.
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clearly a right that belongs only to "the Community" or "the People"
as a whole.63 As Locke expresses it, although the legislative is the
supreme power within
a Constituted Commonwealth,... there remains still in the People a
Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find
the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all
Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that
end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the
trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve into the
hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall
think best for their safety and security. 64
Locke concludes by connecting this right to revolution with the
"Fundamental, Sacred, and unalterable Law of Self-Preservation,"
which empowers the community to preserve itself and its members
against oppression. 6
Now let us consider the implications for a right to arms. Locke's
views on a private right to resistance are highly ambivalent and hardly
provide a strong basis for an individual right to arms to resist the
government. Instead, he generally presents resistance as a collective
rather than an individual activity. When the community determines
that the government has become oppressive, it has a collective right
to resist this oppression by force, to overthrow the government, and
to institute a new one. Implicit in the rights to resistance and
revolution is the right to take up arms against a tyrannical
government. This too is a right that belongs to the people as a whole,
not to individuals as such.
In asserting these rights under revolutionary conditions, the
people can appeal to the natural law of self-preservation, a law that is
"antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws" and constitutions. 66
Do the people also have a right to have arms within a "Constituted
Commonwealth," to use for self-defense in the event that the
government becomes tyrannical? Once again, this is a question that
Locke himself does not address. Presumably, the people would insist
on retaining such a right if it would be to their advantage to do so. It
is unclear, however, whether this would be to their advantage. Arms
involve dangers as well as benefits, since they can be used not only for
63. Id. § 149, at 367.
64. Id. at 366-67; see also id. § 240, at 427 (arguing that "The People [should] be Judge" in
such situations, "for who shall be Judge whether his Trustee or Deputy acts well, and according
to the Trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him have still
a Power to discard him, when he fails in his Trust?").
65. Id.
66. Id. § 168, at 380.
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legitimate self-defense and revolution, but also for unlawful violence
and rebellion. Whether the path of greater safety lies in retaining a
right to arms or not cannot be determined by natural rights theory,
i.e., by reason alone, but only by the people themselves when they
establish a positive constitution. For this reason, it is necessary to
look to the constitution itself to determine the existence and bounds
of any such right.
Suppose, however, that there were a way to ensure that weapons
could not be used for improper or factional purposes, but were strictly
subject to the collective control of the people. In that event, a right to
arms would seem clearly to the people's advantage, for there would
be no danger that the arms would be used for unlawful violence or
illegitimate rebellion. Under these circumstances, insisting on a right
to arms would enhance the people's capacity for self-preservation
without any corresponding disadvantages-assuming, that is, that
citizens were willing to undergo the discipline and burdens incident to
bearing arms within this collective context. In Parts III and IV, I shall
suggest that this notion throws light on the meaning of the Second
Amendment. That provision can be understood to protect the
collective right of the people to have arms, subject to collective
discipline and control within the context of "[a] well regulated
Militia." A right of this sort makes sense within a Lockean analysis,
and also makes sense of the language of the Constitution itself.
C. Conclusion
Locke holds that individuals have a natural right to self-
preservation, yet his thought provides little support for an individual
right to arms. The community as a whole, however, may have such a
right. Although these conclusions may appear paradoxical, they
actually reflect some of the deepest themes of the natural rights
tradition. Individuals have a right to protect themselves and their
rights, yet they cannot effectively do so on their own. If they are to
live in peace and security, disputes must be resolved not by private
force but by the public judgment of an organized community. To
make such a community possible, individuals must largely give up the
right to use force against others. In return, the community
undertakes to protect all of its members, not only against private
violence, but also against governmental oppression. For the natural
rights tradition, then, the locus of legitimate force lies not in private
individuals but in the community as a whole. This is why the tradition
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provides more support for a collective than for an individual right to
arms.
Finally, it is crucial to see such a right in proper perspective.
Locke does not regard the revolutionary use of force as the only, or
even as a particularly desirable, means of preventing tyranny. On the
contrary, he regards the dissolution of government and the need for
violent revolution as among the worst calamities that can befall a
nation. 67  A major purpose of Lockean political theory is to outline
the features of a liberal constitutional state that are capable of
preserving liberty without resort to revolution. For Locke, such a
state must rest on the consent of the people,68 and must not transgress
the limits established by the constitution and the fundamental
principles of natural law. 69  To prevent an undue concentration of
authority, there should be a separation between the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.70 The legislative power should be
entrusted to a collective body of persons who are subject to the laws
that they themselves make.7' The legislature should be at least in
some degree representative of the people72 and should be shielded
from coercion or undue influence by the executive. 73 Elections should
be free.74  The legislature should govern through "settled standing
Laws ''75 that apply to all citizens equally.76 Although the legislature
may regulate property rights, it may not take private property, even
through taxation, without the consent of the people or their
representatives.7 7 The executive should be subject to the law,7 8 and
safeguards should be adopted to prevent abuse of power.79  When
individuals suffer injury at the hands of the government, they should
have legal avenues of redress. 80 The laws should be administered by
67. See id. § 230, at 417-18.
68. See id. §§ 22, 95-104, 134, 171, at 283-84, 330-36, 355-57, 381-82.
69. See id. §§ 131, 134-42, 149, 171, at 353, 355-63, 366-67, 381-82.
70. See id. §§ 91, 107, 143-44, at 326-27, 338-39, 364-65.
71. See id. §§ 94, 138, 143, at 329-30, 360-61, 364.
72. See id. §§ 140, 142, 158, 222, at 362, 363, 373-74, 412-14.
73. See id. §§ 155, 222, at 370-71, 412-14.
74. See id. § 222, at 412-14.
75. Id. §§ 136-37, at 358-60 (emphasis removed).
76. See id. §§ 22, 87, 142, at 283-84, 323-24, 363. On the Lockean roots of the concept of
equal protection of the laws, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection,
Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 563-65 (1991).
77. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 138-40, 142, at 360-62, 363.
78. See id. §§ 90-91, 94, 147, 153, at 326-27, 329-30, 365-66, 369-70.
79. See id. §§ 111, 162, at 342-43, 376.
80. See id. §§ 20, 90-91, 93, 207, at 281-82, 326-27, 328, 403-04.
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independent judges. 81 Finally, there must be room for dissent82-a
notion that Locke's eighteenth-century radical Whig followers
developed into the right to freedom of speech.83 For Locke, these
principles of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law form the
principal line of defense against tyranny. It is only when these
institutions fail that the people are thrown back on the ultimate rights
of resistance and revolution, with all the violence and bloodshed that
they involve. In short, Locke's account is not meant to endorse a
broad right to use force but, so far as possible, to make such force
unnecessary.
II. BLACKSTONE AND THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Now let us turn to Blackstone's views on the right to arms. In
the first book of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, he
observes that this right of Englishmen is rooted in "the natural right
of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." 84
This passage is crucial for those who argue that the Second
Amendment was intended to protect an individual natural right to
self-defense. According to Don Kates and Nelson Lund, "Blackstone
placed the right to arms among 'the absolute rights of individuals at
common law."'85 "[U]nquestionably," Kates writes, "what Blackstone
was referring to was individuals' rights to have and use personal arms
for self-protection." 86  Similarly, Joyce Malcolm writes that
"Blackstone emphatically endorsed the view that keeping arms was
necessary both for self-defense, 'the natural right of resistance and
self preservation,' and 'to restrain the violence of oppression.' 87
"Blackstone's comments on this subject are of the utmost
importance," Malcolm continues, "since his work immediately
81. See id. §§ 91, 131, at 326-27, 353.
82. See id. §§ 13, 92-93, at 275-76, 327-28 (criticizing absolutist governments in which no
one has "the least liberty.., to question or controle those who Execute" the will of the
sovereign, and in which "the Sword presently silence[s] all those that dare question it").
83. See, e.g., 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS NO. 15, at 110
(Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (1755); Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance.: An
Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1283-
84 (1998).
84. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *144.
85. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 10, at 93; see Lund, supra note 10, at 120 (asserting
that "Blackstone classified the right to have suitable arms for self-defense ... among the five
'absolute rights of individuals').
86. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 10, at 93.
87. MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 130 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *144).
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became the great authority on English common law in both England
and America. ' 8  Indeed, the case can be put even more forcefully. In
this passage, Blackstone was describing a right that was protected by
an article of the English Bill of Rights of 168919-a provision that in
turn is a plausible antecedent of the Second Amendment. If
Blackstone interpreted this English provision in individual right
terms, that would be important evidence that the Second Amendment
should be read in the same way.90
Although this understanding of Blackstone is superficially
attractive, a closer reading shows that it fundamentally
misunderstands his position. In fact, Blackstone provides even less
support for an individualist interpretation of the right to arms than
does Locke.
Blackstone's discussion of the right to arms reads (in full) as
follows:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject.., is that of having
arms for their defence suitable to their condition and degree, and
such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same
statute 1 W. & M. St. 2. c. 2 [i.e., the Bill of Rights], and it is indeed,
a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of
resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.91
In exploring this passage, let us begin with Kates's assertion that
"Blackstone placed the right to arms among 'the absolute rights of
individuals at common law.' 92 I think it is fair to say that no one who
reads Blackstone carefully could come to such a conclusion. It is true
that Blackstone discusses the right to arms in a chapter entitled "Of
The Absolute Rights of Individuals." 93  As Blackstone makes
perfectly clear, however, these consist of the following three articles:
94
(1) the right to personal security, which "consists in a person's legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
8& Id.; see also Robert T. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE L.J. 995, 1011 (1995) (describing Blackstone as "[u]ndoubtedly the most important of the
eighteenth-century commentators to discuss the right to arms").
89. Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. stat. 2, ch. 2, § 7 (1689) ("That the subjects which are
protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by
law.").
90. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 88, at 1010 n.65.
91. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *143-44.
92. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 10, at 93. Although Kates places quotation marks
around the phrase "the absolute rights of individuals at common law," no source for the
quotation is identified, and the phrase does not seem to appear in Blackstone.
93. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *121.
94. See id. at *129.
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health, and his reputation"; 9 (2) the right to personal liberty or
freedom of movement; 96 and (3) the right to private property. 97 In
other words, Blackstone's "absolute rights" correspond to the classic
natural rights of life, liberty, and property. The right to arms, on the
other hand, is not an "absolute right" but is one of the "auxiliary
subordinate rights of the subject" 9 -a concept to which we shall
return shortly.
It is also important to observe that, in Blackstone's usage,
"absolute rights" means something quite different than what the term
would mean to us. 99 For Blackstone, absolute rights are those that
pertain to the individual as such; they are rights that persons would
enjoy even in a state of nature, before the formation of society. 1°°
Such rights are contrasted with relative rights, which are those that
arise from various social relationships. 1°0 In designating certain rights
as "absolute," however, Blackstone does not mean to suggest that
they can never properly be restricted. On the contrary, he makes
clear that these rights are subject to regulation to protect others and
promote the common good.102  Consistent with this principle,
Blackstone notes that the right to arms is limited to "such as are
allowed by law. ' 10 3
Finally, we should note that (contrary to Kates's assertion)
Blackstone nowhere suggests that the right to arms derives from "the
common law."1°4  Instead, this is a right that is secured by "the
constitution,"'10 and in particular by the Bill of Rights.10°
What is the nature of this right? Contrary to the position taken
95. Id.
96. Id. at *134 (defining "personal liberty" as "the power of loco-motion, of changing
situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law").
97. Id. at *138.
98. Id. at *141.
99. See Heyman, supra note 76, at 533.
100. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *123.
101. Id. at *124-25.
102. See, e.g., id. at *134, *138 (observing that personal liberty and private property are
subject to limitation by "by due course of law" or "the laws of the land"); id. at *133 (noting that
the right to life can be forfeited by committing a capital crime). As Blackstone explains, the
"absolute rights" of individuals are simply aspects of their natural liberty. See id. at *125.
Within civil society, that liberty is transformed into civil liberty, which he defines as "natural
liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the
general advantage of the public," including the protection of others. Id. at *125-26.
103. Id. at *143-44.
104. Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 10, at 93.
105. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *140-41.
106. See id. at *143-44 (citing Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. stat. 2, ch. 2 (1689)).
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by Kates, Lund, and Malcolm, there is no reason to believe that
Blackstone views it as encompassing an individual right to use arms
for self-defense against private violence. Blackstone discusses the
personal right to self-defense at three main points in the
Commentaries: in connection with the right to life,107 with defense
against tortious injury, 1°8 and with the law of homicide. 10 9 In none of
these passages does he mention a right to possess or use arms for self-
protection. The reasons for this omission are not difficult to discern
in light of our previous discussion. Although Blackstone holds that
individuals are naturally free to "act[] as [they] think fit, without any
restraint or control, unless by the law of nature," he agrees with
Locke that this natural liberty is self-defeating, undermining rather
than securing individual self-preservation. 110
For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the
absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases: the
consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the
same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in
any of the enjoyments of life.'1 '
For this reason, when individuals enter into society, they give up a
portion of their natural liberty in exchange for protection under the
law, and oblige themselves "to conform to those laws, which the
community has thought proper to establish.""' 2 Individuals do retain
a right to defend themselves against imminent violence, for "[s]elf-
defence... is justly called the primary law of nature," and "is not,
neither can it be, in fact, taken away by the law of society.""' 3 But this
right is limited to "sudden and violent cases; when certain and
immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the
assistance of the law."' 1 4 In all other cases, Blackstone holds that
natural liberty is subject to regulation for the preservation of the
society and its members." 5 As we have seen, the question of whether
individuals should be permitted to own weapons would seem to fall
within this general power of the legislature to regulate for the public
good, rather than within the narrow exception for imminent self-
107. See id. at *130-31.
108. See 3 id. at *34.
109. See 4 id. at *180-88.
110. 1 id. at *125.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 3 id. at *4.
114. 4 id. at *184.
115. See 1 id. at *125.
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defense.116  Nothing in Blackstone's Commentaries suggests the
contrary.
It appears, then, that Blackstone does not mention an inalienable
right to arms for private self-defense because he does not recognize
such a right.117 And this is entirely consonant with his general social
and jurisprudential views.1 8 For Blackstone, human nature is fallen,
and human beings are prone to violence and disorder in the absence
of effective social constraints. Liberty cannot long exist in the state of
nature, which is a "wild and savage" condition,11 9 but only within a
strong legal and social order. Thus, in contrast to Locke, Blackstone
emphasizes not the inalienability of natural rights, but the necessity
for those rights to be regulated for the common good. Indeed,
Blackstone does not regard even liberty of speech and press as
inalienable rights.120  Under these circumstances, it would be
surprising if he considered the possession of arms to be such a right.
If Blackstone's right to arms is not an "absolute right of
individuals," or a right of personal self-defense, then how should it be
understood? To answer this question, we must begin with his
description of this right as an "auxiliary right.1 21 After outlining the
three absolute rights, Blackstone remarks that those rights would be a
"dead letter" if the constitution had taken no effective steps
to secure their actual enjoyment. It has, therefore, established
certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve
principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain
inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property. 122
Blackstone proceeds to describe these auxiliary rights as follows:
1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament ....
2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds, so certain
and notorious, that it is impossible he should either mistake or
legally exceed them without the consent of the people.... The
former of these, keeps the legislative power in due health and
vigour, so as to make it improbable that laws should be enacted
destructive of general liberty: the latter is a guard upon the
116. See supra text following note 39.
117. For a persuasive argument that Article VII of the English Bill of Rights, upon which
Blackstone relies, see supra text accompanying notes 89-91, was not concerned with such a right
either, see Schwoerer, supra note 8.
118. The following discussion draws on Heyman, supra note 83, at 1285-87.
119. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *125.
120. See 4 id. at *151-53; Heyman, supra note 83, at 1286-87.
121. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *143.
122. Id. at *140-41.
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executive power, by restraining it from acting either beyond or in
contradiction to the laws ....
3. A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of
applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries....
4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement
of the rights before-mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is
too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right,
appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning
the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of
grievances.
123
The list then concludes with the "fifth and last auxiliary right,"
the right of subjects to "hav[e] arms for their defence ...."124 When
viewed in this context, it is clear that what Blackstone is referring to is
not personal self-defense but defense against tyranny. That is what
he means when he says that the right becomes important "when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression.'
1 25
In short, Blackstone follows Locke in recognizing a "natural right
of resistance and self-preservation" against tyrannical rulers. 126 The
question then arises as to the nature of this right: is it one that belongs
to private individuals or to the people as a whole? Kates, Lund, and
Malcolm seem to assume that since it is described as a "natural right,"
it must be a right of individuals. Traditionally, however, natural
rights could be predicated of collectivities as well as of individuals.
For example, Locke declares that, under the fundamental natural
"Law of Self-Preservation," "the Community" as a whole has a right
123. Id. at *141-43.
124. Id. at *143-44.
125. Id. at *144 (emphasis added). That this is Blackstone's meaning is made unmistakably
clear in the conclusion to this chapter, which summarizes the various rights and their
relationship to one another. After referring to the rights of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property, Blackstone writes:
So long as these remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of
compulsive tyranny and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these
rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. To preserve
these from violation, it is necessary, that the constitution of parliament be supported in
its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And, lastly,
to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England
are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in
the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redress of
grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
defence. And all these rights and liberties it is our birth-right to enjoy entire; unless
where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints.
Id. There can be no doubt that the auxiliary rights which are described in this passage, including
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to defend itself against tyranny.127  Likewise, while some of
Blackstone's auxiliary rights are said to pertain "to every
individual, 1' 28 others, such as the "constitution, powers, and privileges
of parliament," are public rather than private in nature. 29 When
Blackstone refers to the latter as "rights of the subject," then, he must
be using "the subject" in a representative or collective sense, not to
refer to individuals as such.
Unfortunately, nothing in Blackstone's discussion of auxiliary
rights sheds much light on how the right to resistance is to be
understood. Yet he returns to the subject later in Book I, and there
he makes his position crystal clear. The question is what may be done
"when the contracts of society are in danger of dissolution, and the
law proves too weak a defence against the violence of fraud or
oppression" 1 0 3 -language that echoes his earlier discussion."' Here
Blackstone rejects two contrary positions. The first is the absolutist
doctrine of "unlimited passive obedience," which he derides as slavish
and absurd.132 Yet he also rejects "the other extreme": a view that
would "allow to every individual the right of determining [when
resistance is appropriate], and of employing private force to resist
even private oppression.1133 This doctrine, Blackstone asserts, is
productive of anarchy, and (in consequence) equally fatal to civil
liberty as tyranny itself. For civil liberty, rightly understood,
consists in protecting the rights of individuals by the united force of
society: society cannot be maintained, and of course can exert no
protection, without obedience to some sovereign power: and
obedience is an empty name, if every individual has a right to
decide how far he himself shall obey.t 34
Instead, Blackstone holds that "resistance is justifiable" only "when
the being of the state is endangered, and the public voice proclaims
such resistance necessary.1135
127. LOCKE, supra note 13, § 149, at 366-67. As this quotation suggests, not only natural
rights but also natural law can also be said to apply to collective entities. See, e.g., id. § 134, at
355-57 (stating that "the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the
Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick
good) of every person in it").
128. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *143 (discussing the right to petition).
129. Id. at *141. At least to some extent, the same is true of the second auxiliary right:
"[the limitation of the king's prerogative" within clearly defined bounds. Id.
130. Id. at *251.
131. See id. at *144 (discussing the right to resistance "when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression").
132. Id. at *251.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Indeed, as Blackstone makes clear elsewhere, those who take up arms against the
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This position dovetails with Blackstone's broader constitutional
theory. According to that view, government is founded on an
"original contract between king and people," under which the latter
promise allegiance and obedience while the former undertakes to
protect his subjects.13 6 If the king should violate this contract, as
James II was found to have done, 37 then it is the people as a whole
who are the injured party and who have a right to resist tyranny.
138
In short, Blackstone's doctrine is not one of private resistance by
individuals but of "national resistance by the people.' 1 39 And this in
turn provides the key to understanding his view of the right to arms.
As we have seen, Blackstone describes this right as simply "a public
allowance" of the right to resist oppression."4°  If the right to
resistance is one that essentially belongs to the people as a whole,
then the same is true of the right to arms. To be sure, Blackstone
does not discuss how such arms are to be held: whether by individuals
or by the community (for example, in public stores belonging to the
militia). But this would appear to be essentially a practical question.
As a matter of principle, Blackstone's position is clear: the right to
arms recognized by the English Bill of Rights is not intended to allow
individuals to possess weapons for their own purposes, but rather to
ensure that the people as a whole have the means to resist tyranny.
This is a collective right and is subject to collective control. For this
reason, there is no conflict between this right and the qualification,
recognized by the Bill of Rights as well as by Blackstone, that the
right may be regulated by law.14a Because the right is one that belongs
to the people as such, they have the authority to regulate and control
that right through their representatives in Parliament.
In conclusion, a close reading of Blackstone's Commentaries
reveals that his view is similar to Locke's. 142 Blackstone does not
Crown under any other circumstances are guilty of treason:
For the law does not, neither can it, permit any private man, or set of men, to interfere
forcibly [to redress grievances real or pretended]; especially as it has established a
sufficient power, for these purposes, in the high court of parliament: neither does the
constitution justify any private or particular resistance for private or particular
grievances; though in cases of national oppression the nation has very justifiably risen
as one man, to vindicate the original contract between the king and his people.
4 id. at *82.
136. 1 id. at *233-36.
137. Id. at *211, 233.
138. See 4 id. at *81-82, quoted supra note 135.
139. 1 id. at *251.
140. Id. at *144.
141. Id. at *143-44.
142. Blackstone's view is, however, narrower than Locke's in at least two important
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recognize an inalienable right to have arms for private self-defense,
and he understands the right to resistance in collective rather than
individual terms. If, as Malcolm argues, 143 Blackstone had a profound
influence on the American conception of the right to arms, then this
provides powerful evidence against-rather than for-the individual
right interpretation of the Second Amendment.
III. THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC
After declaring independence from Great Britain, Americans set
about the task of drafting constitutions and declarations of rights for
their new state governments. 144  These documents provide an
invaluable window into American political thought during the period,
and shed important light on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
A. The Right to Arms
How was the right to arms understood in post-Revolutionary
America? We can attain great insight on this point by exploring the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.145 This document, which was
drafted by John Adams, contains the most carefully written of all the
state declarations of rights and constitutes one of the best statements
"of the fundamental rights of Americans at the end of the
Revolutionary period." 146
respects. First, Blackstone denies that private persons have a right even in principle to take
arms against the government. See supra text accompanying notes 130-41. Second, Blackstone
recognizes a popular right of resistance, but not necessarily of revolution. Distancing himself
from Locke's theory of revolution, Blackstone writes that
however... just this [view] may be, in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take
any legal steps for carrying it into execution, under any dispensation of government at
present actually existing.... No human laws will.., suppose a case, which at once
must destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will
they make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all legal provisions
ineffectual.
Id. at *161-62. It follows that while Blackstone's right to arms allows for popular "resistance
and self-preservation," id. at *144, it does not necessarily extend to revolution.
143. See supra text accompanying note 88.
144. See generally WILL] PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Rita Kimber
and Robert Kimber trans., 1980); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 125-255 (1969).
145. The preamble and declaration of rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
appear in 5 WILLIAM SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS 93-96
(1975) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS], and are reproduced in the Appendix to this
Article, infra p. 284.
146. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 339
(1971).
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In its preamble, the Massachusetts Constitution sets forth the
relationship between society and its members. The "people" or "the
body-politic" are "formed by a voluntary association of individuals,"
who come together through "a social compact." What is most
remarkable is that, having distinguished between the "people" and
"the individuals who compose it," the document then uses these
terms in a consistent way throughout. This makes it possible to
discern with great clarity how the various rights were understood, and
whether they were viewed in individual or collective terms.
The following are some examples of provisions that ascribe rights
to "individuals," or to related terms such as "men," "persons," or
"subjects": 147
Art. I.-ALL MEN are born free and equal, and have certain
natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in
fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.
II.- ... [N]o SUBJECT shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and
season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience ....
X. -EACH INDIVIDUAL OF THE SOCIETY has a right to be protected
by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to
standing laws ....
XII.- ... [N]o SUBJECT shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled,
or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or
estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
XIV.-EVERY SUBJECT has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his
papers, and all his possessions....
On the other hand, these are some of the passages relating to the
rights to "the people":
IV.-The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive
right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent
State ....
V.-AIl power residing originally in the people and being derived
147. In the following passages, I have marked references to individuals in small capitals, and




from them, the several magistrates and officers of the government
vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are
their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to
them.
VII.-Government is instituted for the common good, for the
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people... ;
therefore the people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right to institute government, and to reform, alter, or
totally change the same when their protection, safety, prosperity,
and happiness require it.
VIII.-In order to prevent those who are vested with authority
from becoming oppressors, the people have a right at such periods
and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of
government, to cause their public officers to return to private life;
and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and
appointments.
In this way, the Massachusetts declaration draws a clear and
uniform distinction between the rights that belong to individuals and
those that belong to the people as a whole. This distinction is
followed so carefully that it is observed even when both sorts of rights
are implicated. Thus, Article XXIX declares that the independence
of the judiciary is essential "for the security of the rights of the
people, and of every citizen."
Article XVII of the Massachusetts declaration reads as follows:
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the
legislature; and the military shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority and shall be governed by it.
In view of the declaration's careful usage, there can be no question
that the "right to keep and bear arms" that it recognizes is one that
belongs not to private individuals but to the people in their collective
capacity. This is made even more clear by the fact that the right is to
bear arms "for the common defence," as well as by the overall
concern of the provision: to control the military force of the
community and guard against the danger of military tyranny.1 41
I have chosen to focus on the Massachusetts Constitution
because of the precision of its language, which strongly illuminates
the nature of the rights that it contains. Yet the same distinction
148. For a similar provision, see N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XVII, in 7
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 402, 403, which opens with the assertion "[tihat the
people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State."
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between "individuals" (or cognate terms) and "the people" is also
generally, although not invariably, observed in the other post-
Revolutionary state declarations of rights. When these documents
recognize a right to bear arms, they always describe it as a right of
"the people," rather than of every "individual" or "man." 149 This is
strong evidence that the right was understood in collective terms.
B. The Militia
How did the people exercise their collective right to bear arms?
The answer is through the militia. Indeed, most of the state
constitutions speak not of a right to bear arms, but rather of the
importance of a citizen militia.1 ° The model for these provisions was
established by the Virginia Bill of Rights, which asserted:
That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
State; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as
dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.151
It should be observed that, apart from the first clause, this provision is
substantially identical to that contained in the Massachusetts
Declaration. In fact, it is not clear that there was any essential
difference in meaning between the two versions. Within the militia,
the people had a right to bear arms, and they exercised this right
through the militia. It seems likely that, for late eighteenth-century
Americans, assertions of the importance of the militia and of the
people's right to bear arms were merely two different ways of saying
the same thing.
Although never mentioned by Locke, the militia held an
important place in eighteenth-century American political thought,
with its characteristic synthesis of liberalism and civic republicanism.
149. In addition to the Massachusetts Declaration, see N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of
1776, art. XVII, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 403; PA. CONST. of 1776,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 277, 279;
VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. XV, in 9 STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 487, 490.
These and other antecedents of the Second Amendment are collected in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS 183-85 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
150. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 18, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 145, at 197, 198; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XXV, in 4 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 372, 374; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I art. XXIV, in 6 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 344, 346; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL, in 7 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 168, 179; VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13, in 10 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 48, 50.
151. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13, in 10 STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra note 145, at 50.
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One way to understand the idea of the militia is through a comparison
with the distribution of political authority in the state. According to
social contract theory, all political power initially belongs to the
community at large.15 2 Although it has the right to retain that power,
the community generally chooses to delegate it to a particular
government. 53 This government need not be democratic in form:
nothing in natural rights theory precludes the community from
establishing a monarchy, an aristocracy, or some other form of
government.154 As the republican tradition taught, however, if the
people were wise, they would not alienate all of their power to the
government but would retain as much as possible for themselves. By
the time of the Revolution, this had become an article of political
faith for Americans.
The idea of a citizen militia can be understood in similar terms.
According to Locke, when individuals enter into society, they not
only give up the broad right to use force for self-preservation; they
also promise to use their "natural force" to assist the community in
enforcing the laws and defending against foreign attack. 155 In this
way, the community acquires a power to direct the force of all its
members.156  This power is subsequently entrusted to the
government. 57 But just as there is a danger that the government will
abuse its political authority, so there is also a danger that it will
misuse its control over the force of the community by invading the
rights of citizens and tyrannizing over them. 158
For this reason, liberal republicans concluded that it was
essential to impose strict constraints on the military power of
government. 59 In particular, the community should rely, to the extent
possible, not on a regular army but on a militia composed of "the
body of the people." 6° Under this regime, the people would retain as
152. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 13, § 87, at 323-24.
153. See id. § 132, at 354.
154. See id.
155. Id. § 130, at 353; see also id. §§ 88-89, at 324-25.
156. See id. § 88, at 324-25; LOCKE, supra note 32, at 26; JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETYER
FOR TOLERATION, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 212, 214,217-18 (12th ed. 1823).
157. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 143-44, at 364-65.
158. See id. §§ 13, 137, 143, 218, at 275-76, 359-60, 364, 410.
159. See, e.g., VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13, in 10 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
145, at 50.
160. Id. This principle was accepted not only by radical Whigs but also by conservative
Whigs like Blackstone. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *408-13 (praising the institution of
the citizen militia, and describing it as "the constitutional security, which our laws have provided
for the public peace, and for protecting the realm against foreign or domestic violence").
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much military power as they could in their own hands. 61  This
approach, it was believed, would protect liberty in two important
ways. First, the existence of a well-armed, trained, and disciplined
militia would minimize the need to establish a standing army' 62-an
institution that all too easily could come to have a separate interest
from that of the people and be made an instrument of tyranny. 163 By
contrast, militia members were citizens first and soldiers second;'
61
there was little reason to fear that they would turn their arms against
themselves, their families, and their neighbors. 65  Second, if the
government did seek to tyrannize over the people, its forces would
not be able to prevail (so it was hoped) against the united force of the
community as embodied in the militia.
66
This notion of a citizen militia represented an advance in natural
rights theory in two respects. First, whereas Locke tended to view the
people as an ultimate but dormant power existing outside the
government, 67 liberal republicanism integrated the people into the
state through the militia, just as they were also integrated through
republican political institutions.' G8 In this way, liberty was made more
secure. Second, if a danger of tyranny should arise, the militia
provided an effective means through which the people could exercise
their collective rights to resistance and revolution-rights that were
161. For a good summary of this position, which brings out the inseparable connection
between the right to bear arms and the militia, see the following statement made during the
debate over ratification of the Constitution:
It is a capital circumstance in favour of our liberty, that the people themselves are the
military power of our country. In countries under arbitrary government, the people
oppressed and dispirited, neither possess arms nor know how to use them. Tyrants
never feel secure, until they have disarmed the people. They can rely upon nothing
but standing armies of mercenary troops for the support of their power. But the
people of this country have arms in their hands; they are not destitute of military
knowledge; every citizen is required by Law to be a soldier; we are all martialed into
companies, regiments, and brigades, for the defence of our country. This is a
circumstance which encreases the power and consequence of the people; and enables
them to defend their rights and priveleges against every invader.
"The Republican" to the People, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 710, 712 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993).
162. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 193.
163. See, e.g., 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 83, Nos. 94-95, at 669-87.
164. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *408.
165. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed.,
n.d.); Williams, supra note 9, at 578.
166. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 310 (James Madison), quoted infra text
accompanying note 199.
167. See LOCKE, supra note 13, §§ 149, 243, at 366-67, 427-28.
168. See Williams, supra note 9, at 554.
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affirmed by many of the state constitutions.169 By contrast, while
Locke and Blackstone recognized the people's right to resist tyranny,
they were vague about how this could be done.
70
In these ways, the institution of the militia was intended both to
make the people's liberty more secure and to provide a concrete,
effective way in which to exercise their natural right to self-
preservation in cases of necessity. This was the ideal that was
embodied in the state constitutional provisions we have looked at,
whether they were phrased in terms of the people's right to bear arms
or the importance of the militia. On this reading, these provisions are
fully consonant with a collective understanding of the right to arms.
C. An Examination of Some Evidence for the Individual Right
Interpretation
Before leaving this subject, we should consider two pieces of
evidence that are often said to support a right to arms for individual
self-defense. The first is Article XIII of the Pennsylvania Declaration
of Rights of 1776, which states that "the people have a right to bear
arms for the defence of themselves and the state.' 7' Unlike the other
169. Thus, the Virginia Bill of Rights asserted
[t]hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of
government that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness
and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal-administration;
and that, when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal.
VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 3, in 10 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 49. For
similar provisions, see DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 5, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS
supra note 145, at 198; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VII, in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 145, at 94; PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. V, in 8 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 278; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. VI, in 9 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 489. "The doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary
power and oppression," added the Maryland and New Hampshire Declarations, "is absurd,
slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind." MD. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS of 1776, art. IV, in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 372-73; N.H. CONST. of
1784, pt. I, art. X, in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 345. For other assertions of
the rights of resistance and revolution in the context of the Revolutionary conflict, see GA.
CONST. OF 1777, preamble, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 443-44; N.J. CONST.
of 1776, preamble, in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 449-50; N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
preamble, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 168-72; PA. CONST. of 1776,
preamble, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 277-78; VT. CONST. of 1777,
preamble, in 9 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 487-89.
170. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *82 (observing that "in cases of national
oppression the nation has very justifiably risen as one man").
171. PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 145, at 279.
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provisions we have considered, this one is ambiguous. The question
is what the declaration means by "the defence of themselves." On
one hand, as Malcolm and others contend, this language could be
read to endorse a right to arms for personal self-defense. 7 2 On the
other hand, "the defence of themselves" could be read to refer to the
collective right of the people to defend themselves against internal
disorder, external invasion, or governmental oppression.
Although the former possibility cannot be dismissed, I believe
that a strong case can be made for the latter interpretation. First, as
in the other state declarations, the Pennsylvania language on the right
to arms appears in a provision that also condemns standing armies
and asserts that the military must be strictly subordinate to the civil
power.173 This strongly suggests that the entire provision is concerned
with the military power of the state, rather than with the rights of
individuals to self-defense.
This interpretation finds further support in the broader context
of the provision, the declaration as a whole. After declaring that
"every member of the society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property," Article VIII goes on to assert
that every individual is therefore "bound to contribute his proportion
towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service
when necessary."' 74  The provision recognizes an exception to this
principle in cases of religious objection: no "man who is
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, [can] be justly compelled
thereto, if he will pay [an] equivalent. '' 7 5 In this way, Article VIII
equates "bearing arms" with the "personal service" that is required of
citizens-that is, with the Lockean duty to employ one's natural force
to assist the government in enforcing the laws and protecting the
community from attack.7 6 This strongly suggests that the declaration
uses "bear arms" in a military sense, and that it is in this sense that
"the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves
172. See MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 148.
173. The provision as a whole consists of a single sentence, which reads:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state;
and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to
be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power.
PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 145, at 279.
174. Id., art. VIII, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 278.
175. Id.
176. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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and the state. '1 77 Indeed, the first state constitutions never clearly use
the term "bear arms" in any other sense.'78
In my view, then, there is no persuasive reason to believe that the
meaning of Article XIII of the Pennsylvania declaration was
substantially different than that of the other declarations we have
seen. If, however, that provision is read to encompass a right to arms
for individual self-defense, this was a distinctly minority position
among the states.179  And while this language appears in a
constitutional amendment recommended by a minority of the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, it does not appear in the
amendments proposed by the majority of any state convention, 180 nor
in any version of the Second Amendment as it evolved in the First
Congress. 81  Therefore, even if the Pennsylvania provision bore an
individual right meaning, there is little reason to believe that this
meaning was incorporated in the Second Amendment.
Finally, recognizing that most state declarations did not expressly
recognize an individual right to arms, Malcolm argues that such a
right was implicit in other provisions of the state declarations. 182 For
example, the first Article of the Massachusetts declaration asserted:
177. This interpretation finds further support in a subsequent provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution:
The freemen of this commonwealth and their sons shall be trained and armed for its
defence under such regulations, restrictions, and exceptions as the general assembly
shall by law direct, preserving always to the people the right of choosing their colonel
and all commissioned officers under that rank, in such manner and as often as by the
said laws shall be directed.
PA. CONST. of 1776, PLAN OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, § 5, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 145, at 279. From the language used ("The freemen of this commonwealth ... shall
be trained and armed for its defence"), it seems reasonable to infer that this provision, Article
VIII of the Declaration of Rights (on the duty to "yield [one's] personal service" through
"bearing arms" for the "protection" of the members of society), and Article XIII of the
declaration (on "the people[s'] right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state"),
are all meant to refer to the same activity-participation in a citizen militia. Similarly, "the
people" who have a right to choose their officers under section 5 would appear to be the same
"people" who have "a right to bear arms" under Article XIII.
178. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145,
at 447 (organizing the militia of each county based on the number of men "liable to bear arms");
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 179 (exempting
Quakers from "the bearing of arms" in defense of the community). For further discussion of
the military meaning of "bearing arms," see WILLS, supra note 12, at 256-59.
179. Apart from Pennsylvania, only Vermont adopted the "defence of themselves"
language. See VT. CONST. of 1777, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XV, in 9 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 490. Vermont was not recognized as a state of the Union
until 1791.
180. The proposals of the state conventions are collected in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 149, at 181-83.
181. The evolution of the Amendment's text is traced in id. at 169-81.
182. MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 148-49.
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All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. 183
"It is difficult," Malcolm observes, "to see how the right to defend
one's life could be fully exercised if citizens were deprived of the right
to be armed." '84  She concludes that "the individual's right to be
armed, [even] where not specifically mentioned, is unmistakably
assumed."81
This argument is unconvincing. To begin with, only a handful of
the state declarations refer to a right of "defending their lives and
liberties. ' 186 Most of the declarations contain neither this right nor the
Pennsylvania language that supposedly recognizes an individual right
to "bear arms. ' 187  Moreover, the language will not bear the
interpretive weight that Malcolm places on it. When a state
declaration speaks of an "unalienable right" to defend life and liberty,
that cannot mean that individuals retain as sweeping a right to use
force against others as they possess in the state of nature, for such a
right would be inconsistent with the very existence of civil society.
According to Locke, an individual in the state of nature who judges
another to pose an ongoing threat to his life has a right to destroy the
other-a right that is unbounded by time or place. This conflict is
183. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. I, in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 93
(emphasis added).
184. MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 149.
185. Id. at 148.
186. As Malcolm observes, see id. at 149, this language was adopted in Massachusetts, see
supra note 183 and accompanying text, and in Pennsylvania, see PA. CONST. of 1776,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 278. Of the
original thirteen states, the only other state to recognize a natural right of "defending life" was
New Hampshire, which did not describe the right as an inalienable one. See infra note 190.
Malcolm claims that the "defending life" language also appears in the first section of the
Delaware Declaration of Rights. See MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 149, 215 n.68. In this she is
mistaken. Like many other slaveholding states, Delaware chose not to open its declaration of
rights with a ringing statement of the natural rights of mankind. See DEL. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS of 1776, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 197. The language does appear
in the Vermont declaration. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. I, in 9 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 145, at 489.
187. This is true of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. See
CONN. CONST. of 1776, art. I, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 144; DEL.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 197; MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 372; N.C.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 402; VA.
BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 10 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 48. The remaining




what Locke calls the state of war. "To avoid this State of War,"
Locke explains, "(... wherein every the least difference is apt to end,
where there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders) is one
great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the
State of Nature.' 188 Within civil society, the right to use force in self-
defense is a narrow one, and does not necessarily include a right to
arms.89  When the opening articles of the Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts declarations speak of an inalienable right to defend
life, one cannot assume that they mean more than this.19° Therefore,
even if we view these articles solely in doctrinal terms, they do not
endorse an individual right to arms.
It would be a mistake, however, to approach these articles solely
on a doctrinal level. For their primary purpose is not to secure a
specific set of legal rights, but rather to proclaim the natural freedom
and equality of individuals and to articulate the fundamental
objectives they seek to attain when they establish society and
government. Of course, these objectives include defending and
protecting their lives, liberties, and properties. But the main way in
which individuals do so is not through the use of private force, but
through the formation of a social order that will protect their rights
under the law. It is in this way, above all, that individuals are capable
of "seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." 191  In other
words, Article I should be read together with the rest of the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, and in particular with the
statement that "[e]ach individual of the society has a right to be
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property,
according to standing laws." 192
In short, there is little reason to believe that an individual right to
arms was implicit in the language of the few state declarations that
188. LOCKE, supra note 13, § 21, at 282.
189. See supra text following note 39.
190. This is even more clearly true of the New Hampshire declaration, which lists "the
enjoying and defending of life and liberty" as a natural right, but adds, "When men enter into a
state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order to insure
the protection of others." N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, arts. II-III, in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 145, at 344. While the Declaration asserts that other rights, such as those of
conscience, "are in their very nature unalienable," it does not say that this is true of the right to
use force in self-defense. Id. arts. IV-V.
191. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. I, in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 93.
192. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 94.
The Pennsylvania Declaration contains substantially similar language. See PA. CONST. of 1776,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. VIII, in 8 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 278; see
also MASS. CONST. of 1780, preamble, in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 92-93
(expressing the ideal "that every man may, at all times, find his security in [the laws]").
[Vol. 76:237
NA TURAL RIGHTS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
mentioned a natural right of "defending life and liberty." Even if
there were, however, this would do nothing to advance the case for an
individualist reading of the Second Amendment. The "defending life
and liberty" language appears in none of the amendments proposed
by the state ratifying conventions, nor does it appear in the
amendments introduced by Madison in the First Congress. Instead,
these proposals speak of "the enjoyment of life and liberty.119 3 And
as finally adopted, of course, the Bill of Rights contains no provision
of this kind. Thus if, as Malcolm suggests, the individual right to arms
is to be found in the "defending life" language, one can only conclude
that this right was not made a part of the federal Constitution.
IV. THE RATIFICATION DEBATE AND THE ADOPTION OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
In late-eighteenth-century America, then, the right to bear arms
was generally understood to be a collective right that was exercised
through a citizen militia. This is the right that was secured by the
Second Amendment.
A. The Debate over the Constitution
When the federal Constitution was proposed in 1787, it was
immediately attacked for creating too powerful a national
government. Two objections are of particular relevance for our
purposes. First, Antifederalists objected that Congress would have
the power to raise a standing army that could be used to destroy
193. The proposal of the Virginia convention read:
That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social compact
cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.
Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention, Declaration of Rights, first, in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS 17, 17 (Helen E.
Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. Similar (or identical)
proposals were made by the conventions of New York, see Amendments Proposed by New
York Convention, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 21, and North Carolina, see
Amendments Proposed by North Carolina Convention, Declaration of Rights, art. 1, in 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 243, 243 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
Madison's proposal would have "prefixed to the constitution a declaration":
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people;
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using
property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
Madison Resolution, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 11.
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public liberty and erect a military despotism. 194  Second, they
criticized the provisions of Article I that empowered Congress to
provide for organizing and calling forth the militia in order "to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions."'95
In response, Federalists argued that, far from being a defect in
the Constitution, Congress's powers regarding the militia were
favorable to liberty, for the best way to avoid the need for a standing
army was to have an effective militia.196 A small army, they argued,
might be necessary to defend the country from insurrection or
attack. 97 Yet they ridiculed the notion that, within the democratic
system envisioned by the Constitution, there was reason to fear the
establishment of a military tyranny. As Madison put it in the forty-
sixth Federalist:
That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of
time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray
both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformily
and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the
military establishment; that the governments and people of the
States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and
continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to
burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the
194. See, e.g., A Democratic Federalist, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 161, at 74-76; Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government
Proposed by the Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. In a
Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, NO. 2 [hereinafter Federal
Farmer], in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, 233 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Essays
of Brutus, Nos. VIII-X, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 358, 405-17; Dissent of
the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention [hereinafter Pennsylvania Minority], in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 526, 549-50.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16. For some Antifederalist criticisms, see 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 508-09 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976-78) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (statement of John Smilie in
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention) ("The last resource of a free people is taken away; for
Congress are to have the command of the militia."); Pennsylvania Minority, supra note 194, at
550-51 (arguing that "under the guidance of an arbitrary [federal] government, [the militia] may
be made the unwilling instruments of tyranny").
196. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 165, at 176-77 (Hamilton); 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 193, at 521 (statement of James Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention); 3 id. at 381, 412-14 (statements of James Madison in Virginia convention); id. at
392, 428 (statements of George Nicholas); id. at 401 (statement of Edmund Randolph) ("In
order to provide for our defence, and exclude the dangers of a standing army, the general
defence is left to those who are the object of defence.").
197. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 165, at 150-52 (Hamilton); id. NO. 25, at
156 (Hamilton); id. NO. 28, at 170-73 (Hamilton); id. No. 41, at 261-63 (Madison); 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 193, at 520-21 (statement of James Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention); 3 id. at 389-90 (statement of George Nicholas in Virginia convention); id. at 401
(statement of Edmund Randolph); Answers to Mason's "Objections": "Marcus" [James Iredell],
No. IV, in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 392-94.
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incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged
exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober
apprehensions of genuine patriotism.
198
Madison added that, even if one were to make such an
"[e]xtravagant... supposition," the largest standing army that
Congress would be able to raise would be no match for "a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their
common liberties, and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence.' ' 199  Of course, this
statement reflects precisely the same view as the state declarations of
rights: it portrays the people as possessing and using arms as members
of a citizen militia, for the purpose of collective self-defense.2 °°
Another Antifederalist objection proved more difficult to meet.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 empowered Congress to
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.2 10
But suppose, asked George Mason and Patrick Henry in the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, that "the general government should neglect
to arm and discipline the militia? 20 2  Could not Congress by that
method effectively disarm and destroy the state militias?2 3 In
response, Madison denied that the Constitution, in "giving the
general government the power of arming the militia, takes it away
from the state governments. The power is concurrent, and not
exclusive. '20 4 Yet this was hardly the only reasonable interpretation,
and it failed to reassure Mason and Henry, who demanded that the
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 165, at 310 (Madison). In arguing that a
conspiracy to impose military despotism was highly improbable, Madison followed Hamilton,
see id. NO. 26, at 164-65, who concluded that "[i]n reading many of the publications against the
Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance":
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in [such objections] that one is at
a loss whether to treat [them] with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider [them]
as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to
instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.
Id. No. 29, at 179-80 (Hamilton).
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 165, at 310 (Madison).
200. See supra text following note 150.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
202. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 380 (statement of George Mason).
203. See id. at 379-80; id. at 386 (statement of Patrick Henry); see also id. at 418 (statement
of William Grayson) (same).
204. Id. at 382 (statement of James Madison).
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Constitution be amended to make clear that the states retained a
power to arm the militia.
2 5
B. The Adoption of the Second Amendment
Presumably, it was concerns of this sort that led the Virginia
convention to propose the following amendment to the Constitution:
[VIRGINIA PROPOSAL]
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to
arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State. That
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to and governed by
the Civil power. 2°
6
This recommendation, which was soon endorsed by the ratifying
conventions of New York and North Carolina,2° became the starting
point for the Second Amendment. When Madison introduced his
draft of the Bill of Rights in the First Congress in June 1789, he
included the following amendment:
[MADISON DRAFT]
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best
security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person.2 08
205. See id. at 380 (statement of George Mason) ("I wish that, in case the general
government should neglect to arm and discipline the militia, there should be an express
declaration that the state governments might arm and discipline them. With this single
exception, I would agree to this part, as I am conscious the government ought to have the
power."); id. at 386-87 (statement of Patrick Henry) (arguing that the Constitution should be
amended to expressly recognize concurrent state power to arm and discipline the militia).
206. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, Declaration or Bill of Rights,
Seventeenth, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 19. In addition to
amendments in the nature of a bill of rights, the convention proposed others that related to the
powers of the federal and state governments. Several of these amendments also sought to
restrict Congress's power to create a standing army and to reinforce state power over the militia.
See Amendments to the Body of the Constitution, Ninth-Eleventh, in id. at 20.
207. See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 22; Amendments Proposed by North Carolina Convention,
Declaration of Rights, No. 17, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 244. The various state
proposals are collected in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 149, at 181-83.
208. Madison Resolution, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 12.
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As adopted by the House of Representatives, the provision read:
[HouSE VERSION]
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being
the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and
bear arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous
of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person.209
The Amendment received its final form in the Senate, where it was
altered to read:
[SECOND AMENDMENT]
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.
2 1 0
What light does this legislative history shed on the meaning of
the Second Amendment? To begin with, it is clear that the language
proposed by the Virginia, New York, and North Carolina conventions
was drawn from the state declarations of rights. As we have seen,
those declarations recognized the collective right of the people to
bear arms through the militia.21' This is strong evidence that the
Second Amendment was meant to be understood in the same way.
This interpretation finds further support in the phraseology of
the various drafts of the Amendment. First, in exempting
conscientious objectors, Madison's draft and the House version both
equate "bear[ing] arms" with "render[ing] military service in person."
The clear implication is that the right to "bear arms" relates to service
in the militia. Second, both the Virginia proposal and the House
version refer to a militia "composed of the body of the people." This
usage suggests that "the people" who have a "right to keep and bear
arms" are the same as "the body of the people trained to arms" that
constitutes the militia. As in the state declarations of rights,
references to the militia and to the people's right to bear arms appear
to be two different ways of saying the same thing.212 Nor is this usage
an uncommon one: in the Virginia convention, Madison himself is on
record as using "the people" and "the militia" synonymously. 213
209. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, art. 5, in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 38.
210. Articles of Amendment, as Agreed to by the Senate, art. 4, in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 48. The drafting and evolution of the Amendment is traced in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 149, at 169-81.
211. See supra Part III.
212. See supra text following note 150.
213. In explaining the constitutional provision authorizing Congress to provide for calling
forth the militia, Madison stated:
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In these ways, the development of the constitutional text lends
further support to a collective right interpretation. As for the
recorded debates over the Amendment in the First Congress, they are
rather brief and unhelpful, focusing largely on the question of
religious exemption from military service. 214 They do, however, tend
to confirm the view that the Amendment was concerned with the
institution of the militia and the right to bear arms in that context. 215
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws,.., it ought to be overcome.
This could be done only in two ways-either by regular forces or by the people. By one
or the other it must unquestionably be done. If insurrections should arise, or invasions
should take place, the people ought unquestionably to be employed, to suppress and
repel them, rather than a standing army. The best way to do these things was to put
the militia on a good and sure footing, and enable the government to make use of their
services when necessary.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 378 (statement of James Madison in Virginia Ratifying
Convention) (emphasis added). Similarly, in responding to Antifederalist charges that federal
control over the militia might lead to tyranny, Edmund Randolph, the governor of Virginia
(who was soon to become the first attorney general of the United States), asked, "Shall we be
afraid that the people, this bulwark of freedom [as Patrick Henry had called the militia], will
turn instruments of slavery? The officers are to be appointed by the states. Will you admit that
they will act so criminally as to turn against their country?" Id. at 400 (statement of Edmund
Randolph). For another example, see "The Republican" to the People, supra note 161, at 712
("[T]he people themselves are the military power of our country.... [E]very citizen is required
by Law to be a soldier; we are all martialed into companies, regiments, and brigades, for the
defence of our country.").
It is likely that this is what the Federalist Noah Webster meant when he wrote (in a
passage frequently quoted by supporters of the individualist interpretation of the Second
Amendment) that military tyranny is possible only when the government possesses a
military force... superior to any force that exists among the people, or which they can
command; for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first exercise of acts of
oppression. Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are
in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce
unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and
constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence,
raised in the United States. A military force, at the command of Congress, can execute
no laws, but such as the people perceive to be just and constitutional; for they will
possess the power, and jealousy will instantly inspire the inclination, to resist the
execution of a law which appears to them unjust and oppressive.
A Citizen of America [Noah Webster], in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at
129, 155. It seems most unlikely that Webster would have suggested-or would have expected
his readers to believe-that unorganized individuals would clearly "constitute a force superior
to any band of regular troops that can be ... raised in the United States." See infra note 236 and
accompanying text. Instead, when he referred to the superior force that can be exerted when
"the whole body of the people are armed," he evidently meant the people acting as an
organized, disciplined force, i.e., as a militia.
214. The House debates may be found in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193,
at 182-85, 198-99, and THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 149, at 185-91. At this time,
debates in the Senate were not public and went unrecorded.
215. For example, Elbridge Gerry objected to the religious-exemption clause on the ground
that it would allow the rulers to "declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them
from bearing arms." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 182 (statement of
Representative Gerry). This statement makes sense only if "bearing arms" refers to military
service, for exclusion from the militia would not prevent individuals from having arms for their
own purposes. Similarly, Representative Scott argued that if there were a right to religious
exemption, "you can never depend upon your militia. This will lead to the violation of another
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On the other hand, the debates give no indication that the
Amendment was meant to protect an individual right to have arms
for one's own purposes, or outside the context of the militia.216
C. The Meaning and Purposes of the Second Amendment
If this analysis is correct, then the Second Amendment
recognizes the collective right of the people to keep and bear arms
through a civic militia. One virtue of this interpretation is that it is
able to read the language of the Amendment as a coherent whole. By
contrast, supporters of the individual right interpretation are forced
to argue that the Amendment "was meant to accomplish two distinct
goals": to secure an individual right to arms and to recognize the
importance of the militia.217  On the view developed in this Article,
the Amendment does not consist of two disparate parts, but expresses
a single unified principle, protecting a right of the people as a whole.
What purposes was this constitutional right meant to serve?
First, it was clearly meant to reaffirm the importance of the militia
and to ensure that the federal government could not disarm it. In this
way, the Amendment sought to reduce the need for a standing
army. 218
article in the constitution, which secures to the people the right of keeping arms . Id. at 198
(statement of Representative Scott). Again, it is difficult to see how this could be true unless
the right in question is to keep arms in the context of the militia.
216. Observing that the Senate rejected a proposal to insert the words "for the common
defence" after "bear arms," see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 149, at 174-75,
Halbrook and Malcolm argue that the Amendment must have been intended to recognize an
individual right to arms for self-defense, or even for hunting. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at
81; MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 161. As Wills points out, however, a more likely explanation is
that on the national level, the phrase "for the common defence" had come to be used to refer to
the defense of the country as a whole. See WILLS, supra note 12, at 256, 340 n.5. For example,
the Articles of Confederation provided that "[a]ll charges of war, and all other expences that
shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the united states in
congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the
several states .... ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VIII (emphasis added); see also id. art.
VII (prescribing how officers should be appointed "[w]hen land-forces are raised by any state
for the common defence") (emphasis added). (The text of the Articles of Confederation may be
found in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 954-64.). Of course, the phrase
bears the same meaning in the original Constitution. See U.S. CONST. preamble (declaring that
one object of the Constitution is "to provide for the common defence"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
(providing that Congress shall have power "[to lay and collect Taxes .... to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). Since there was
no intention to restrict the militias' right to bear arms to cases in which they were defending the
nation as a whole, it would have been inappropriate to add "for the common defence." See
WILLS, supra note 12, at 256.
217. MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 162-64.
218. As Elbridge Gerry put it, "the use of a militia" was "to prevent the establishment of a
standing army, the bane of liberty." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 182
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A more difficult question is whether the Amendment was
intended to enable the people to resist the national government if it
should become tyrannical. Many of the state constitutions recognized
the rights of resistance and revolution,219 and some of the state
ratifying conventions urged the adoption of amendments to reaffirm
those rights.220 In his June 8, 1789, speech, Madison proposed an
amendment to declare "[t]hat the people have an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their
government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the
purposes of its institution. ' 221 Congress declined, however, to include
such a provision in the Bill of Rights. As we have seen, Federalists
regarded Antifederalist fears of tyranny as "extravagant" and "far-
fetched. '222 In the wake of Shays's Rebellion and other uprisings,
Federalists were more concerned about the danger of unlawful
insurrections and insisted that the government must have adequate
power to suppress them.223 Nonetheless, even Federalists recognized
(statement of Rep. Gerry). Yet the Second Amendment did not purport to take away
Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8, to establish an army. The Federalist George
Nicholas expressed the point more clearly in the Virginia Ratifying Convention when he stated
that, by granting Congress this authority while at the same time preserving the institution of the
militia, the Constitution had taken the best course:
Till there be a necessity for an army to be raised, militia will do. And when an army
will be raised, the militia will still be employed, which will render a less numerous army
sufficient. By these means, there will be a sufficient defence for the country, without
having a standing army altogether, or oppressing the people [by relying solely on the
militia].
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 389-90 (statement of George Nicholas).
219. See supra note 169.
220. Virginia, seconded by North Carolina, proposed the following amendment:
That Government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the People; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power
and oppression is absurd slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, Declaration or Bill of Rights, third, in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 17; Amendments Proposed by North
Carolina Convention, Declaration or Bill of Rights, No. 3, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193,
at 243 (with minor differences in punctuation). New York suggested a declaration "[t]hat the
Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary
to their Happiness." Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 21.
221. Madison Resolution, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 11-12.
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 165, at 310 (Madison); id. NO. 29, at 179
(Hamilton); see supra text accompanying note 195.
223. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 165, at 100 (Hamilton); id. NO. 27, at
167-68 (Hamilton); id. NO. 28, at 170-72 (Hamilton); id. No. 29, at 181-82 (Hamilton); 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 378, 413-14 (statements of Madison in Virginia Ratifying
Convention) ("If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws,... it ought to be
overcome."). For further discussion, see Michael A. Bellesiles, The Second Amendment in
Action, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (2000); Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia": The
Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000). As Saul
[Vol. 76:237
NA TURAL RIGHTS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
in principle that the federal government might become tyrannical,
and that in such case the people would have a natural right of
resistance-a right that they could exercise most effectively through
the state militias.2 4 On the whole, it seems reasonable to conclude
that while the Second Amendment itself does not recognize a right of
resistance, it was intended to protect an institution, the militia,
through which the people could exercise that right if necessary.22
In this way, the Amendment indirectly secured the collective
right to self-preservation discussed by Locke and Blackstone. On the
other hand, there is very little reason to believe that the Amendment
was intended to protect an individual right to arms for personal self-
defense or other purposes. That is not to say, of course, that the
possession of arms for these purposes necessarily was unlawful at the
time. As this Article has shown, however, the natural rights tradition
provided little support for an inalienable individual right to arms, and
there is no persuasive evidence that the Second Amendment was
intended to secure such a right. Indeed, there was no reason to
address this issue in a federal bill of rights: the question of whether
and to what extent individuals should be allowed to have weapons for
private purposes was properly a matter for the states, through the
exercise of their police powers.26
It is sometimes argued that even if Second Amendment rights
applied only within the militia, the arms themselves were to be
provided and owned by individuals.2 27 It is true that this was a
traditional method of arming the militia, an approach that can be
traced from medieval England through the militia laws of the
American colonies.2 28 By the time of the American Revolution,
however, this approach had begun to give way to the more modern
view that arming the militia was a public responsibility. In the
Cornell has shown, fears of insurrection were not limited to Federalists, but were shared by
some leading Antifederalists as well. See Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The
Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 221, 240-45 (1999).
224. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 165, No. 26, at 163-64; id. No. 28, at 173-75
(Hamilton); id. No. 29, at 181 (Hamilton); id. No. 46, at 308-11 (Madison).
225. For a similar position, see David C. Williams, The Constitutional Right to
"Conservative" Revolution, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 416 n.9, 426 n.45 (1997)
(expressing view that the Second Amendment was intended to "guarantee a right of arms for
revolution, but.., not necessarily... the right of revolution itself").
226. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000).
227. See, e.g., Barnett & Kates, supra note 3, at 1206.
228. On the English militia laws, see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *411; MALCOLM,
supra note 3, at 3-9. On colonial American laws, see MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 138-41.
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
Articles of Confederation, for example, each state engaged to "always
keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed
and accoutred, and [to] provide and constantly have ready for use, in
public stores,.., a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp
equipage." 29
Public provision of arms was not merely an ideal, it was a
necessity. As the historian Michael Bellesiles has shown, the new
nation suffered from a desperate shortage of firearms, and even most
of the militia lacked such arms. 230 Under these conditions, it was
wholly impractical to expect individuals to acquire weapons on their
own; if the militia was to be armed, it could only be through
governmental action.231 As Jack Rakove has observed, the Federalists
and Antifederalists were in complete accord on this point; their
disagreement focused on whether the states or the federal
government should have the greatest authority in this area.
232
That is not to say, however, that the Second Amendment
mandated that arms be provided or owned by the public rather than
by individuals. The object of the Amendment was to ensure that the
national government would not disarm the militia-not to specify
229. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, para. 4. Similarly, New York sought to ensure
that its militia should always "be armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service," by
ordaining "that a proper magazine of warlike stores, proportionate to the number of
inhabitants, be, forever hereafter, at the expense of this State, and by acts of the legislature,
established, maintained, and continued in every county of this State." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XL, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 179. For further discussion, see WILLS,
supra note 3, at 259 (discussing the common practice of keeping the militia's arms in public
arsenals).
230. See Bellesiles, supra note 223; Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of the Gun Culture in
the United States, 1760-1865, 83 J. AMER. HIST. 425 (1996). As Bellesiles notes, for example, an
1803 government census of firearms found-after more than a decade of intensive federal
efforts to promote domestic gun production-that
[i]n a country with 524,086 official militiamen,... [there were only] 183,070 muskets;
39,648 rifles; and 13,113 other firearms, for a total of 235,831 guns .... That was
enough guns for forty-five percent of the militia, one quarter of the white male
population, and just 4.9 percent of the nation's total population. Half of all these guns
were in the hands of the federal government, with about one-quarter in state arsenals.
Bellesiles, supra note 223, at 86 (citing 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 162,
198-99, 215-17). For a fuller account of Bellesiles's research, see MICHAEL A. BELLESILES,
ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000).
231. See Bellesiles, supra note 223, at 81-89.
232. See Rakove, supra note 226, at 125-26. As we have seen, much of the debate over the
Constitution and the Second Amendment makes sense only on the assumption that the militia
was to be armed by the government itself. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 202-05
(discussing the objection of George Mason and Patrick Henry that Congress could disarm the
state militias simply by failing to arm them); text accompanying notes 215 (discussing remarks of
Reps. Gerry and Scott in House debate); see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 421
(statement of John Marshall) ("If Congress neglect our militia, we can arm them ourselves.
Cannot Virginia import arms? Cannot she put them into the hands of her militia-men?").
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how the militia's arms should be provided, how they should be held,
or who should own them. These matters were left to be settled by
militia laws at the state and federal level. 233 Thus, it is not true that
the Second Amendment established an individual right to own arms
for militia purposes.
Let us conclude by considering a final objection to the thesis that
the Second Amendment right was intended to apply only within the
context of the militia. Blackstone connected the right to arms with
the collective right to resist tyranny, but he did not expressly connect
those rights with a citizen militia. 234 Is it possible that the Second
Amendment protects a right to arms not merely within the militia but
also for purposes of collective resistance outside that context?
Although this possibility cannot be excluded, there is good reason to
be skeptical of it. As we have seen, the right to resistance was one
that belonged to the people collectively. If the people lack effective
institutions through which to exercise this right, they can only do so in
an informal, unorganized way. If, however, the people have
institutions through which to formulate and work their will, including
representative government and a citizen militia, then it is natural for
the collective right to resistance to be exercised through those
channels.235 Not only is this the most legitimate course, it is also the
233. Throughout the debates over the Constitution and the Second Amendment, Federalists
argued that constitutional provisions on the militia should contain only general principles, not
specifics that were more appropriately left to legislation. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 193, at 421 (statement of John Marshall in Virginia Convention) (rejecting the notion that
"a militia law is to be ingrafted on the scheme of government, so as to render it incapable of
being changed"); id. at 426 (statement of George Nicholas) (stating that the Constitution's
militia clauses confer general powers, and that "particular instances must be defined by the
legislature"); CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 184 (statement of Rep.
Benson in House debate) (arguing that the Second Amendment should deal only with
"fundamentals," and that all other issues "ought to be left to the discretion of the government").
234. It is possible, however, to read Blackstone to implicitly make such a connection.
Compare 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *143-44, and 4 id. at *81-82 (recognizing a limited
right to take up arms against the government), with 1 id. at *408 ("[I]n free states,.., no man
should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and it's laws" through service in the
militia.).
235. For the assumption that this is how the right would be exercised within the federal
system, see THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 165, at 174 (Hamilton); id. NO. 46, at 310
(Madison), quoted supra text accompanying note 199. As Hamilton explained:
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against
invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.... The legislatures will have
better means of information [than the people at large]. They can discover the danger
at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the
people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine
all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in




most effective one, for as both Federalists and Antifederalists
recognized, the unorganized people stand little chance of prevailing
against a standing army.236 At the same time that a right to arms for
unorganized resistance has much less value, it also poses greater
dangers, since it might well facilitate unlawful insurrections,
something that was of great concern during the founding period.
237
For all of these reasons, it cannot be merely assumed that those
who adopted the Bill of Rights desired to recognize a right to arms
for unorganized resistance and revolution. To determine whether
they did in fact recognize such a right, we must look to the language
of the Amendment itself. And, as I have argued, that language is
most reasonably construed to secure a right to arms within the
context of a "well regulated Militia."
Finally, even if the right to arms for collective resistance was not
limited to the militia, that should not place the right beyond the
bounds of regulation. As a right that would belong to individuals as
members of the people as a whole, the right would be subject to
collective control and discipline. Otherwise, the situation that would
be created would be the very antithesis of the "well regulated
Militia," which it is the stated purpose of the Amendment to
promote. Moreover, even on this interpretation, the legislature
would retain the power to regulate any possession or use of arms that
is unrelated to the purpose of collective self-defense.
CONCLUSION
In common with Locke and Blackstone, eighteenth-century
Americans believed that the fundamental law of nature was the
preservation of mankind. But this was a goal that could not be
achieved by relying on private force, but only through the united
force of the community. Americans further believed that, in a
Id. No. 28, at 174. Similarly, when Patrick Henry declared, "The great object is, that every man
be armed," he was referring to the state militia. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 193, at 386. It
was that, and not some form of unorganized resistance, that he regarded as "our ultimate
safety." Id. at 385; see also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 195, at 508-09 (statement of
John Smilie in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention) (describing the militia as "[t]he last
resource of a free people").
236. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 165, at 173-74 (Hamilton); 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 193, at 380 (statement of George Mason) ("When, against a regular and
disciplined army, yeomanry are the only defence, -yeomanry, unskilful and unarmed,-what
chance is there for preserving freedom?"); id. at 386-87 (statement of Patrick Henry) (arguing
that in the absence of a well-armed and disciplined militia, nothing "will ... save you, when a
strong army of veterans comes upon you").
237. See supra text accompanying note 223.
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republican government, the people should retain as much control
over this force as possible. In this way, they could avoid the dangers
posed by a standing army and would also be in a position to resist the
government if it should become tyrannical. These functions were
performed through a well-regulated militia. It was in this context that
the people had a right to bear arms, and it was this right that the
Second Amendment was meant to protect.
Finally, let me say a few words about how we should understand
the Second Amendment today. The idea of a universal civic militia
seems very remote from the conditions of modern warfare. And we
no longer rely on such a militia to protect us from tyranny. This
should not be a subject of regret. Locke, Blackstone, and the
American founders regarded armed revolution as a last resort. It
meant the breakdown of the constitutional order and a return to the
state of war, in which disputes could be resolved only through force.
Instead, the founders sought to prevent tyranny primarily through
such institutions as representative government, the separation of
powers, an independent judiciary, and constitutional protections for
individual rights. These institutions have worked so well that the
notion of armed revolution has become anachronistic. This is a sign
of strength, not weakness, in our constitutional system. In short, the
right to arms has evolved from an "auxiliary right" 38 to an archaic
one.
That is not necessarily to say that a citizen militia could not be
revived. 239 But this can be done only by the people themselves,
through their representatives in the state and federal governments.
The right secured by the Second Amendment is a collective one
which can be asserted only by the people as a whole. This cannot be
done by judicial fiat, any more than the courts are capable of creating
other basic social and political institutions. If the Supreme Court
were to read an individual right to arms into the Second Amendment,
the result would be precisely the opposite of what the founders
intended - to entrust the use and regulation of force to the
community as a whole.
238. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *143-44.
239. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 3, at 487 (suggesting that, if Second Amendment





MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: PREAMBLE AND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS*
PREAMBLE
The end of the institution, maintenance and administration of
government is to secure the existence of the body-politic; to protect it,
and to furnish THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMPOSE IT with the power of
enjoying, in safety and tranquillity, their natural rights and the
blessings of life; And whenever these great objects are not obtained
the people have a right to alter the government, and to take measures
necessary for their safety, prosperity, and happiness.
The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of
INDIVIDUALS; It is a social compact by which the whole people
covenants with EACH CITIZEN and EACH CITIZEN with the whole
people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good. It is the duty of the people, therefore, in framing a constitution
of government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as
well as for an impartial interpretation, and a faithful execution of
them; that EVERY MAN may, at all times, find his security in them.
We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, acknowledging, with
grateful hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe,
in affording us, in the course of His providence, an opportunity,
deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence, or surprise, of
entering into an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each
other, and of forming a new constitution of civil government, for
ourselves and posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so
interesting a design, do agree upon, ordain and establish the following
declaration of rights and frame of government, as the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
* In 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 145, at 92-96. To highlight the nature of the
rights contained in this document, I have marked references to individuals in small capitals, and
references to "the people" in bold. For discussion of the document, see supra Part III.A.
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PART THE FIRST. A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Art. I.-ALL MEN are born free and equal, and have certain
natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties;
that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.
II.-It is the right as well as the duty of ALL MEN in society,
publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the
great Creator and Preserver of the universe. And NO SUBJECT shall
be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession or
sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct
others in their religious worship.
III.-As the happiness of a people, and the good order and
preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety,
religion and morality, and as these cannot be generally diffused
through a community, but by the institution of the public worship of
God, and of public instructions in piety, religion and morality:
Therefore, To promote their happiness and to secure the good order
and preservation of their government, the people of this
commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with power to
authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time to time,
authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies-politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision,
at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God,
and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of
piety, religion and morality in all cases where such provision shall not
be made voluntarily.
And the people of this commonwealth have also a right to, and
do, invest their legislature with authority to enjoin upon ALL THE
SUBJECTS an attendance upon the instructions of the public teachers
aforesaid, at stated times and seasons, if there be any on whose
instructions they can conscientiously and conveniently attend.
Provided notwithstanding, That the several towns, parishes,
precincts, and other bodies-politic, or religious societies, shall at all
times have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers and of
contracting with them for their support and maintenance.
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And all moneys paid by THE SUBJECT to the support of public
worship and of the public teachers aforesaid, shall, if he require it, be
uniformly applied to the support of the public teacher or teachers of
his own religious sect or denomination, provided there be any on
whose instructions he attends; otherwise it may be paid towards the
support of the teacher or teachers of the parish or precinct in which
the said moneys are raised.
And every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves
peaceably and as GOOD SUBJECTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, shall be
equally under the protection of the law: And no subordination of any
one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.
IV.-The people of this commonwealth have the sole and
exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and
independent State, and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and
enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not, or may not
hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the United States of
America in Congress assembled.
V.-All power residing originally in the people and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of
government vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or
judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times
accountable to them.
VI.-No MAN NOR CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION OF MEN
have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive
privileges distinct from those of the community, than what arises from
the consideration of services rendered to the public, and this title
being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children or
descendants or relations by blood; the idea of a man born a
magistrate, lawgiver, or judge is absurd and unnatural.
VII. - Government is instituted for the common good, for the
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and not
for the profit, honor, or private interest of ANY ONE MAN, FAMILY,
OR CLASS OF MEN; therefore the people alone have an incontestable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government, and to
reform, alter, or totally change the same when their protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness require it.
VIII. -In order to prevent those who are vested with authority
from becoming oppressors, the people have a right at such periods
and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of
government, to cause their public officers to return to private life; and
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to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and
appointments.
IX.-All elections ought to be free; and ALL THE INHABITANTS
OF THIS COMMONWEALTH, having such qualifications as they shall
establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect
officers, and to be elected, for public employments.
X.-EACH INDIVIDUAL OF THE SOCIETY has a right to be
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property,
according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute
his share to the expense of this protection; to give his personal
service, or an equivalent, when necessary; but no part of the property
of ANY INDIVIDUAL, can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied
to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative
body of the people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not
controllable by any other laws than those to which their constitutional
representative body have given their consent. And whenever the
public exigencies require that the property of ANY INDIVIDUAL
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable
compensation therefor.
XI.-EVERY SUBJECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH ought to find a
certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character.
He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and
without delay, conformably to the laws.
XII.-No SUBJECT shall be held to answer for any crime or
offence until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally,
described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence
against himself; and EVERY SUBJECT shall have a right to produce all
proofs that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against
him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his
counsel at his election. And NO SUBJECT shall be arrested,
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of
his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land.
And the legislature shall not make any law that shall subject ANY
PERSON to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the
government of the army and navy, without trial by jury.
XIII.-In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts, in the
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vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities of the life,
liberty, and property of THE CITIZEN.
XIV.- EVERY SUBJECT has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his
papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or
more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in
cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.
XV.-In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits
between two or more PERSONS, except in cases in which it has
heretofore been otherways used and practised, THE PARTIES have a
right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held
sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas, and such as relate to
mariners' wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to
alter it.
XVI.-The liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a State; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this
commonwealth.
XVII. -The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the
common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to
liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.
XVIII.-A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of
the constitution, and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice,
moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality, are absolutely
necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free
government. The people ought, consequently, to have a particular
attention to all those principles, in the choice of their officers and
representatives: and they have a right to require of their lawgivers
and magistrates an exact and constant observance of them, in the
formation and execution of the laws necessary for the good
administration of the commonwealth.
XIX.-The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give
instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative
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body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of
the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.
XX.-The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the
laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by
authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only
as the legislature shall expressly provide for.
XXI.-The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either
house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that
it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action
or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.
XXII.-The legislature ought frequently to assemble for the
redress of grievances, for correcting, strengthening, and confirming
the laws, and for making new laws, as the common good may require.
XXIII.-No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties, ought to be
established, fixed, laid, or levied, under any pretext whatsoever,
without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the
legislature.
XXIV. - Laws made to punish for actions done before the
existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by
preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of a free government.
XXV.-No SUBJECT ought, in any case, or in any time, to be
declared guilty of treason or felony by the legislature.
XXVI.-No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive
bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual
punishments.
XXVII.-In time of peace, no soldier ought to be quartered in
any house without the consent of THE OWNER; and in time of war,
such quarters ought not to be made but by the civil magistrate, in a
manner ordained by the legislature.
XXVIII.-No PERSON can in any case be subjected to law-
martial, or to any penalties or pains, by virtue of that law, except
those employed in the army or navy, and except the militia in actual
service, but by authority of the legislature.
XXIX. -It is essential to the preservation of the rights of EVERY
INDIVIDUAL, his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an
impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It
is the right of EVERY CITIZEN to be tried by judges as free, impartial,
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore,
not only the best policy, but for the security of the rights of the
2000]
290 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:237
people, and of EVERY CITIZEN, that the judges of the supreme
judicial court should hold their offices as long as they behave
themselves well; and that they should have honorable salaries
ascertained and established by standing laws.
XXX.-In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may
be a government of laws and not of men.
